rich client db security in an untrusted environment

From: Tomi N/A (hefes..mail.com)
Date: Fri Apr 25 2008 - 08:29:08 EDT

  • Next message: Kevin Menard: "Re: rich client db security in an untrusted environment"

    Hi everyone,

    I am working on the architecture of a future system and am stuck at security.
    The stack is GNU/linux, postgresql, cayenne and tomcat.
    Alongside the web application, I will have a WebStart-capable swing
    client which accesses the (remote) database.
    I don't want the db username or password ever to be known outside of
    the database server.
    The only solution I came up with is using ROP (don't know if any of
    it's limitations are going to hurt): the user enters his/her
    _application_ credentials which are sent to tomcat, tomcat verifies
    the credentials using JDBCRealm (reading from the application
    database) and allows the client to use the cayenne web service.
    Theoretically, a malicious user might write his own swing app and log
    in using a valid username/password combination to do whatever he likes
    in the database (having the complete db mapping at his disposal). This
    worries me, but it might be good enough for now (as the attacker
    wouldn't be able to compromise the database without valid
    credentials).
    In this case I have complete autonomy deciding how we're going to
    build the application, but what would I do if I couldn't use ROP (say,
    no servlet container available)? Other possibilities?

    I very much welcome opinions and comments.
    Regards,
    Tomislav



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